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This paper studies determinants of FDI in Turkey using panel data analyses. The results of 
the study show that political stability, education level, rule of law, and trade cost have 
significant impact on FDI inflow in Turkey while similarity in economy size of home and 
host country (Turkey) has not. The effect of the trade cost and rule of law was surprising but 
it gave a clue to new research area. It was concluded that next studies of FDI determinants in 
Turkey must be conducted at firms’ level to better understand the behaviour of foreign direct 
investments in the country.  
 
 
JEL Classification F21 
Keywords FDI,  Turkey, Rule of Law, Trade cost 
  
Author’s e-mail  o.huseynli@gmail.com 
Supervisor’s e-mail adam.gersl@gmail.com  
 
 






List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... x 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xi 
Master Thesis Proposal ...................................................................................................... xii 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
2. FDI in Turkey and Turkish Economy ........................................................................... 3 
3. Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 15 
4. Conceptual framework and methodology .................................................................... 28 
5. Data description ......................................................................................................... 35 
6. Empirical results ......................................................................................................... 37 
7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 53 
Core Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 57 
References ......................................................................................................................... 62 
Data sources: ..................................................................................................................... 63 




   x 
 
 
List of Tables      
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics…………………………………………………36 
Table 2. Estimations of Pooled OLS model………………………………..…39 
Table 3. Estimations of Random Effect model………………………...….….40 
Table 4. Estimations of Fixed Effects model………………………………....43 














   xi 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. Economic growth of Turkey during 2000-2012…………………….…5 
Figure 2. Convergence with EU………………………………………………....6 
Figure 3. Inflation in Turkey during 2001-2007……………………………..…..7 
Figure 4. Export and import data in Turkey between 2006 and 2012……….....10 
Figure 5. FDI in Turkey by sources and type of investments….………………..12 
Figure 6. Share (in %) of projects by sectors during 2007-12…………………..14 















   xii 
Master Thesis Proposal 
Author:  Bc. Orkhan Huseynli 
Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Adam Geršl Ph.D. 
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Proposed Topic: 
Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Markets:   The Case of Turkey 
Topic Characteristics: 
My thesis will focus on determinants of inward FDI in Turkey. Turkey’s rapidly 
growing economy attracts investors and it is thus relevant to analyse the determinants 
of inward FDI. For my research, I will use official data (mostly reports) from official 
websites of Turkey and international organizations (like Ministry of Economy, Invest 
in Turkey, OECD, UNISTAT and others). The methodology of my research will 
follow existing literature.    
 
There is some literature on FDI in Turkey, such as Kayam (2009) or Central Bank of 
Turkey (2013). In my research, I will follow Esiyok (2010) who covers the main 
determinants of FDI inflows in Turkey that were not covered by previous authors.  
However, my research will provide additional value added to Esiyok (2010), namely: 
(i) I used the data between 2001 untill 2012 for the research as opposed to Esiyok 
(who used data since 1982 to 2007) because most of FDI inflows into Turkey are 
concentrated between 2000-2011 time period. In addition, this is the period when 
political stability was established in Turkey and the new government started many 
projects to improve Turkey’s economic and institutional structure; (ii) my 
observations cover top 25 countries that have directly invested in Turkey during 
selected time period. It includes not only OECD countries but also non OECD 
countries that were not covered by previous studies including Esiyok’s; (iii) I used 
variables different from what Esiyok had used for defining FDI in Turkey. First of 
all, I include EDUC variable which is going to capture education level in Turkey. I 
also include political stability and rule of law variables while Esiyok just use one 
variable that captured both of these variables.  
Hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis #1: 
Political stability in the country attracts higher volume of FDI.  
2. Hypothesis #2: 
Higher level of education attracts FDI into the country  
3. Hypothesis #3:  
Better institutional framework of a country would increase its inward FDI  
4. Hypothesis #4: 
Similarity between countries sizes increases FDI between them 
5. Hypothesis #5: 
      Higher trade costs of firms motivate them to switch to FDI. 
Methodology: 
I am going to specify a panel model with cross section dimensions (home countries 
“i”,i=N number of countries,  and the host  country Turkey “h” and time dimension 
“t”, K years, to test the above mentioned hypotheses.  
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The model will be specified as a gravity model as it contains variables such as trade 
cost between two countries and market size of two countries  
 
lnFDIhit= β1PSTABht + β2lnSimiht+β3TCi+β4EDUht+ β5LAWht +εi, where 
 
lnFDI – log of inward FDI data to Turkey 
PSTAB - political stability of a host country at time “t” 
LnSimIndex – log of similarity index of GDPs of a country (i) and the host country  
TC - trade costs of exports from country (i) to the host country (Turkey). 
EDU – education level of host country at time “t”   
LAW - rule of law in the host country (Turkey) 
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1. Introduction 
Turkey has always been very interesting to investors for its large domestic market, skillful 
labor force and geographical location. Its rapidly growing economy attracts investors from 
all over the wold. Only for the last five years there had been registered 395 investment 
projects with total value of USD 87.1billion. It is the result of Turkish Government’s 
successful economic program after the 2001 banking sector crisis. A stable 
macroeconomic and institutional framework has brought the country to the prosperity and 
rapid growth. Therefore for the last 10 years, Turkey had been competitive over other 
growing economies because of its strong economy, political stability, future growth 
potential, solid banking sector and institutional framework.  It was interesting to know 
which of these factors had really been determinants of FDI in Turkey and the extent of 
their effect on FDI inflow.  
After reviewing relevant literature, I decided to employ a knowledge-capital framework 
(Markusen et al., 1996) to estimate FDI determinants in Turkey. I followed Esiyok (2010) 
who covered the main determinants of FDI inflows in Turkey that were not covered by 
previous authors like Kayam (2009) or Central Bank of Turkey (2013).  However, my 
research provides additional value added to Esiyok (2010), namely: (i) I used the data 
between 2001 untill 2012 for the research as opposed to Esiyok (who used data since 1982 
to 2007) because most of FDI inflows into Turkey are concentrated between 2000-2011 
time period. In addition, this is the period when political stability was established in 
Turkey and the new government started many projects to improve Turkey’s economic and 
institutional structure; (ii) my observations cover top 25 countries that have directly 
invested in Turkey during selected time period. It includes not only OECD countries but 
also non OECD countries that were not covered by previous studies including Esiyok’s; 
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(iii) I used variables different from what Esiyok had used for defining FDI in Turkey. First 
of all, I include EDUC variable which is going to capture education level in Turkey. There 
is empirical evidence that higher level of education attracts more FDI inflow to the host 
country. It totally coincides with the fact that Republic of Turkey had been conducting 
huge investments in education since 2001-2002 and exactly since that time the level of 
FDI inflow had been increasing in Turkey.  
To capture the level of institutional framework in Turkey, I used World Bank’s rule of law 
index instead of bilateral treaties as a binary variable used by Esiyok. Namely, this index 
reflects the quality of how contract terms and property rights are respected in the country. 
Also I include one more variable to the model – political stability. Number of empirical 
works like Buthe, T. & Milner, H. (2008), Bissoon, O. (2011) and Haksoon, K. (2010) 
show strong relationship between political stability and FDI inflow. It is important to note 
that Esiyok (2010) took political stability and institutional framework as one variable 
contrary to what I did. I have two different indices because in my paper institutional 
framework is more about law enforcement, property rights, copyrights and business code 
while political stability is about probability of the government destabilization that may 
happen as a result of unconstitutional or violent actions. 
The thesis is structured as follows: first, I introduce basic and relevant information about 
foreign direct investment in Turkey and Turkish economy in chapter 2. In chapter 3, I 
provide brief information on the main theories and literature relevant to my research.  
Chapter 4 covers the conceptual framework and methodology employed in this paper. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the data used during empirical estimations. Finally, chapter 6 
covers empirical estimations and then, in chapter 7, I provide concluding remarks of the 
paper and give some comments regarding conducted work.   
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The contribution of this study to the existing literature could be summarised as follows. 
First this study partially confirms the previous studies on foreign direct investment 
determinants in Turkey. Even using different time period and larger sample of countries, 
similarity index is found insignificant, while trade cost – significant. Esiyok (2010) had 
same findings regarding these variables.  
Second, some of variables used by Esiyok were extended to get more precise estimations. 
For example, Esiyok used political stability and institutional framework as one variable, 
while I had them as separate variables. This split was made taking into consideration other 
empirical papers. These two variables account for different factors and they should not be 
taken as one variable. As a result, each of these variables was found significant.  
Third, it was found out that trade cost has negative effect on foreign direct inflow contrary 
to Esiyok’s finding. It was inferred that this finding didn’t contradict Esiyok’s result but 
just was a matter of different study. Namely, it was found out that whether the trade cost 
has positive or negative effect on foreign direct investment depends on nature and 
characteristics of an investing firm. Therefore, it was concluded that next empirical work 
covering foreign direct investment inflow must be done on firms’ level.  
 
2. FDI in Turkey and Turkish Economy 
2.1 Transition period between 2001 and 2007 
In this paper, I will be concentrated more on economic trends of Turkey since 2001. 
However, it is important to mention that Turkey had been struggling to improve its 
economic indicators almost for a century since the establishment of Republic of Turkey. 
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By 1999, Turkey had high budget deficit and high inflation. Turkey entered into the IMF 
stand-by arrangement (SBA) in December 1999 in hope to fix its economic issues. 
Although, initially, the programme was successful, it could not help to decrease the 
inflation rate for the expected time period.  
Although inflation started to fall, the process was slower than anticipated. At the same 
time, interest rates also fell down much later than expected. Meanwhile, these factors 
along with steady real exchange rate appreciation increased domestic demand and current 
account deficit. Moreover, Turkey could not get expected results from its fiscal and 
structural reforms which became an impediment for diligent implementation of adopted 
SBA programme. In 2000, faced with increased interest rates and the treasury’s borrowing 
capacity, Central Bank of Turkey injected liquidity in the system which kept interest rates 
from rapid growing. Nevertheless, in the beginning of 2001, the Treasury again faced high 
interest rates on the market which led to new measures on monetary policies of the 
country. By the end of 2001, the real GDP had declined by 5.7%, investments collapsed 
by 30% and industrial output dropped by 8.7% as a result of unsustainable economic 
situation in the country. Unemployment rate continued to grow reaching 10.4 % in 2002. 
Public debt had increased from 38.2 % of GDP in 2000 to 74.1% of GDP by 2001. 
(Macovei, 2009). Ozatay and Sak (2002) found out that the root cause of the emerging 
financial crisis was combined effects of weak banking sector and high public sector 
borrowing. Public sector borrowing requirements were quite large comprising 10% of 
GDP during 1999-2002. During the same period, several banks were caught on fraud and 
taken by authorities. Eventually, banking sector had deteriorated to the point where it 
could not provide stable financing of the public debt. This was a signal of growing 
unsustainability in the banking sector leading Turkey to the banking crisis. 
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But Turkey’s 2000–01 banking crisis was a very important point in the country’s growth 
story. To prevent the country from repeated inadequate macroeconomic policies and save 
it from a weak regulatory environment, the government undertook sound structural 
reforms with very diligent control of running processes. The undertaken economic 
programs were focused on strong macroeconomic and structural reforms. The main goal 
of undertaken policies was to improve banking system creating better investment climate, 
liberal foreign investment and privatization environment.  
Thus, during 2001 and 2002, Turkey has improved its macroeconomic stability conducting 
sound fiscal and monetary policies.  A set of structural reforms were undertaken in the 
banking sector that positively affected the stock of contingent liabilities. In addition, a lot 
of important reforms were also conducted in the area of enterprise restructuring and 
privatization, trade liberalization, labor market and business environment. These measures 
helped the country to boost its foreign and domestic investments, increase labor 
productivity and thus inducing economic growth.  
Since 2002, Turkish Economy had started recovering from 2000/2001 crises through these 
economic and regulatory reforms that improved Turkish economy’s resilience to shock.     
Figure 1. Economic growth of Turkey during 2000-2012 
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In addition, decreasing political uncertainty was important factor in economic recovery of 
Turkey between 2000 and 2012. This happened thanks to single-party majority 
government which won elections in 2002 and played significant role in implementation of 
IMF stand-by arrangement and other reforms.  
Figure 2. Convergence with EU 
 
Source: based on data compiled from OECD stat 
The peak of economic recovery lies in period between 2002 and 2007 when the real GDP 
grew on average by 6.8% annually. Growth can be explained by increasing private 
consumption and investment boom growing on average by 15%. Government had been 
putting a lot of effort in improving the business environment and attracting FDI to the 
country. The result of these efforts can be observed from increasing investment ration that 
climbed from 22% in 2002 to 29% in 2007. Significant growth was recorded in 
machinery, motor vehicles and metals. This was a progress for Turkish economy as before 
it had been known only for its traditional low value-added sectors like textiles, leather 
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Europe in economic growth as demonstrated in figure 2. GDP per capita grew from 
around 8 200 USD in 2002 to around 13 900 USD in 2007 and unemployment rate fell 
from 10.3 in 2002 to 8.8 in 2007.  
Macroeconomic stabilization program implemented during 2002-2007 was very 
successful and played a significant role in inducing growth during this period. Turkey’s 
adopted fiscal consolidation program helped to decrease the public debt burden to low 
levels and increase investor confidence and inflationary expectations. The public sector 
borrowing requirement was reduced from around 12% of GDP in 2001 to almost 0 in 
2007.  Also, the debt-to-GDP ratio had been reduced because of the appreciation of the 
Turkish lira in real terms. External debt comprised only one third of the 2001 value by the 
end of 2007. 
Monetary policies were designed to support macroeconomic stabilization. First of all, the 
newly independent central bank adopted strict fiscal policy to pursue price stability 
objective. It managed to stabilize inflation expectations which caused the decline of 
annual inflation rate from 54,4% in 2001 to 8,8% in 2007 as depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Inflation in Turkey during 2001-2007 
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2.2 Economic Growth by 2011-2012 
After a rapid economic transformation between 2001-2007, Turkey has had fascinating 
economic growth by 2012 with GDP growth rate of nearly  6 % in average and per capita 
income of almost 11 000 USD in 2012 compared to very small number of 3 000 USD 
recorded in 2001. It is important to note that Turkey as well as the rest of emerging 
markets had been affected by the global crisis of 2007-2008. It had experienced economic 
slowdown because its economy was linked with the global economic and financial system 
as any other free-market economy.  As a result, demand on Turkish export had declined 
and there was significant slowdown in capital flows from abroad. This was immediately 
followed by net capital outflows, currency depreciation and a fall in stock prices. In 
addition rising risk premium and decreasing liquidity in the banking sector worsened the 
investor environment and economic situation. Such situation had lead Turkey to the point 
where uncertainty over Turkish economy were rising followed by loss of business and 
consumer confidence in the market. Therefore, there was significant decrease in 
investments and households’ consumption in the country.  
But its strong fiscal discipline saved Turkey from the burden of crisis. Turkey had been 
very careful in its budget management: it had decreased its general government budget 
deficit/GDP ratio to 2.6% in 2011 from 17% that was recorded in 2001. In addition, 
Turkey had also decreased its net public debt to GDP ratio from 91% (in 2001) to 39 % (in 
2011) and had improved its debt stock by making it more resilient to fluctuations. These 
results were the outcome of diligent fiscal policy over the last decade and thus Turkey 
outperformed most of EU countries in 2011.  
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Meanwhile the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) cut the main policy 
interest rate and targeted interest rate of 6.5 % by November 2009. As a result nominal 
interest rates reached the lowest level and real interest rates approached almost zero. That 
was first time when the real interest rate approached such level since the beginning of 
2002. In addition, required reserve ratio of the Turkish lira was reduced from 6% to 5% in 
October 2009 to support liquidity and lending environment. Despite lots of effort to keep 
inflation rate at 6 %, the inflation rate had reached 8.9 % in 2012.  By that time, the 
domestic demand had been growing slowly but exports were increasing although it had 
not been expected. 
The overall growth rate between 2008 and 2009 became less than the growth rate in the 
period of 2002 and 2007.  Despite the economic slowdown during the global crisis, 
Turkey had managed to overcome the consequences of the downfall and achieved a 
growth rate of about % 9 in the next year and %8.8 in 2011.  
In 2012 the Turkish economy grew only by % 2.2 (below the expected %2.6) because its 
exports didn’t cover declining domestic demand. Specifically, it is the joint effect of two 
factors: low domestic consumption and increase in state consumption and investment 
expenditures.  Still even this small growth was accompanied by a gross domestic product 
of almost USD 65 billion making Turkey the 17
th
 largest economy in the world with a 
GDP of about USD 800 billion in the same year.  
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2.3 Foreign Trade and FDI in Turkey 
Foreign Trade 
Turkey plays an important role in international trade and global economy as a rapidly 
growing emerging market. The volume of its total exports had reached the level of almost 
USD 153 billion in 2012 supplying more than 200 countries with various services and 
goods. The annual average growth of Turkish exports was 11% between 2000 and 2010, 
which is higher than both the world’s average growth rate - 6% and emerging market’s 
average growth rate - 8%.  
Figure 4. Export and import data in Turkey between 2006 and 2012 
 
Source: based on data compiled from TurkStat 
Also in the last decade, Turkey finally made significant changes in the commodity 
composition and structure of its exports. Its share of motor vehicles, machinery and 
equipment become higher than the share of traditional exports, such as textiles and 
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increased to Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa over the last 10 years making the 
Turkish export less dependent on demand in Europe. Also, there was diversification in the 
sourcing of exports within the country. Earlier exports were concentrated in major cities 
like Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and Antalya. However for the last decade, a lot of medium 
sized producers have been established in other parts of Turkey that mainly export their 
goods to neighboring countries.  
 
FDI in Turkey 
Turkey had positioned itself as one of the most attractive investment destinations for 
foreign investors. The country is very attractive for its successful economic performance 
in recent years, its strategic location, skilled labor force, large domestic market, low tax 
rates, various incentives, customs union with EU, and, at last, stable political and 
economic environment that was established recently.  
Having investments in Turkey, international companies open the gates to three regions: 
Middle East, Europe and Africa. This is one of the reasons why one third of top 500 
companies in Turkey are sponsored by foreign investors. Today, the cumulative value of 
foreign investments comprise almost USD140 billion. These investments are unusually 
either industrial or services projects. Although Turkey’s skillful labor force is most 
suitable for manufacturing projects, most of investments account for services projects. 
Most of foreign direct investment projects between 2007 and 2012 were located in 
Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara and Bursa. These are the most attractive cities in Turkey because 
of their perfect geographical location, developed transport and logistics systems, 
infrastructure and labor force. The implemented projects mostly covered knowledge-
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driven sectors like financial services, communication technologies, and business services. 
But in earlier years, between 2000 and 2007, other sectors like real estate, construction, 
hospitality and energy were main focus of foreign investors in Turkey. Most of foreign 
direct investments in Turkey come from developed countries rather than from developing.  
Namely, the European Union is the main source of investment flowing to Turkey, where 
Germany and United Kingdom are the largest funders present in the country. 
In recent years there was also significant increase in investments from developing 
countries to Turkey. For example, Azerbaijani oil companies started acquiring some of 
Turkey’s existing businesses, building their own chain of petrol stations and business 
centers.    
According to the report of Ernst & Young (2013), major part of investments will cover 
expansion of existing businesses in Turkey and join ventures. Less than half of foreign 
direct investments will cover Greenfield investments and acquisitions. 
 
Figure 5. FDI in Turkey by sources and type of investments 
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In near future, Turkey plans investment of USD 250 billion in energy and transportation 
sectors that are important for accelerating trade and investment environment in the 
country. This is an important part of plan to become one of the top 10 economies in the 
world by 2023.  
 
FDI by sector 
Investors show bigger interest in knowledge-intensive and heavy industry sectors. This 
interest is also supported by government which puts a lot of effort to improve the relevant 
investment climate. According to the country report from Ernst & Young (2013), the top 
sectors for foreign direct investment in Turkey are business services and financial services 
although the Turkish government puts more value on manufacturing and financial 
intermediation.  
There are several reasons why business services had been the most preferred sector 
between 2007 and 2012. It was combination of two factors: 1) a lot of companies had 
established their sales and marketing offices in Turkey because of its strong growth 
potential and macroeconomic stability; 2) also a lot of companies from other sectors build 
up their presence in the country. These are two significant factors that created 
opportunities for services sector. 
Manufacturing sector has accounted for 34.4 % of the total projects between 2007 and 
2012. According to survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2013), 38.5 % of respondents 
plan to invest in manufacturing in Turkey. Labor force and cost competitiveness are main 
determinants of interest in this sector. Some of investors in manufacturing are focused on 
the production for the local Turkish market while others - for export. Most of these 
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manufacturing projects are initiated by investors from Western Europe. This is the part of 
their long term strategy whose goal is to relocate operations from their home countries to 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Right after manufacturing sector, the most desirable sector in Turkey for foreign investors 
is sales and marketing. Investors mainly from US, Germany and the UK have big appetite 
for this industry. The average growth rate of the sector between 2007 and 2012 was 53.8 
%.  
Figure 6. Share (in %) of projects by sectors during 2007-12 
 
Source: Ernst & Young’s EIM, 2013 
Also in recent years, Information, communication and technology sector in Turkey has 
been gaining more and more interest of foreign investors. Currently, the ICT sector in 
Turkey represents a huge investment opportunity for domestic and foreign investors and 
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international companies like Huawei, Ericsson and the Vodafone Group, have established 
R&D centers in Turkey.  
And at last, the financial services sector in Turkey has been also growing in recent years 
making it very interesting sector for foreign investors. The average growth rate of the 




3. Literature Review 
3.1 Theoretical background: Electric paradigm 
Dunning (2001 and 1993) developed the eclectic paradigm theory that explains why firms 
do businesses abroad via trade or foreign direct investment. According to Dunning, FDI 
flows are determined based on three types of advantages: Ownership, Location and 
Internalization. That is why his theory is named OLI paradigm. His study suggests that 
firm, first, looks for ownership advantages which refer to intangible assets that are 
exclusive possesses of the firm for period of time.  
Second, it must be beneficial for the company to use owned assets rather than sell them or 
rent them abroad. This is location specific advantage. Third, the firm must benefit from 
the ownership and location advantages and internalize them (internalization advantages).  
Further, Dunning (1993) identifies four types of FDI based on motive of investment: 1) 
market-seeking, 2) resource-seeking,  3) efficiency-seeking and 4) asset seeking.  
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Market-Seeking investment - investment is planned to serve local market where 
investment takes place. Firms having for market-seeking motive usually want to avoid 
restrictions imposed by the government in the home country like tariffs, and host country 
like import restrictions, import control and etc.  
Natural Resource-Seeking Investment – Firms pursuing this motive want to decrease their 
costs and get efficient and stable supply resources.  
Efficiency-Seeking Investment – sometimes, when MNEs are going large enough, they 
aim to increase their global competitiveness and overall efficiency.  
Asset-Seeking Investment –  after certain stage of development, some MNEs want to 
expand its global position pursuing long-term strategic objectives like acquisition of 
different firm’s assets abroad (even its competitors’).  
The OLI framework gives basic idea about how and why firms become multinationals.  
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm have been used in several empirical studies analyzing the 
determinants of FDI.  For example, Carmen Stoiana and  Fragkiskos Filippaios (2008) 
used OLI paradigm in their study which aim was to test the effect of ownership and 
location advantages in determining the internalization decisions by Greek investors. The 
analyzed the Greek economy during 1990s when the opening up of neighboring markets 
created an opportunity for the Greek firms to exploit their ownership advantages and 
expand abroad. Stoiana and Filippaios used Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (OLI) as a valid 
context specific framework to analyze foreign direct investment (FDI) determinants.  
 
3.2 New Trade Theory Approach 
The New Trade Theory Approach was developed to compensate shortcomings of OLI 
framework. Specifically, it fails to explain the rise of FDI among rich industrial countries 
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at the time of falling trade barriers. Therefore sometimes it is called the industrial-
organization approach to trade. It incorporates ownership, location and internalization 
advantages into general equilibrium models and predicts the pattern of trade. In this new 
framework, knowledge capital is the ownership advantage and its joint-input characteristic 
increases internalization advantages. As OLI framework, it also has location advantages 
which include trade costs, market size and differences in relative endowments of 
countries. The new theory explains the location decision of MNEs by competing 
hypothesis – the proximity-concentration and the factor proportion hypothesis. (Esiyok, 
2010) 
According to Proximity-Concentration Tradeoff hypothesis firms expand horizontally 
across borders to enter the targeted market at the expense of production scale economies 
(Carr,  L., Markusen, R., & Mask, E., 2001). For example, consider two sector two 
country worlds with identical demand and constant elasticity of substitution σ among 
various goods.  If a firm has to select one option from two - to export or cross border 
expansion/foreign direct investment, its decision whether to expand abroad via trade or via 
investment depends on a trade-off between scale advantages and proximity advantages 
from establishing production in one location. (Brainyard, L., 1993) 
Factor Proportion Hypothesis is based on the theory of endowment comparative 
advantage, most specifically land, labor and capital. An example of the advantage gained 
by this model is if you were to take two countries, where first country (A) exports labor 
intensive goods (i.e. textiles) to the  second country (B) who in turn trade capital intensive 
goods (Financial market). In this way wages paid to labor in the country (A) increases as 
returns to capital employed increase in the second country (B). (Clark, K., 2009) 
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3.3 Determinants of FDI in Turkey 
There were conducted only a few empirical studies about FDI in Turkey.  Recai Coskun 
(2001) analyses earlier surveys examining determinants of FDI in Turkey and finds out 
that major determinants of foreign direct investment in Turkey are factors such as ``the 
promising Turkish economy’’ and ``growing local market’’ rather than location-specific 
factors such as low cost labor, cheaper inputs and geographical location. 
Demirhan, E. and Masca, M. (2008)  examine the determinants of foreign direct 
investment inflows in developing countries over period of 2000-2004 by estimating cross-
sectional econometric model. They found growth rate of per capita, telephone main lines, 
degree of openness, inflation rate and tax rate statistically significant. All variables had 
positive sign except inflation rate and tax rate. Labor cost and risk were found 
insignificant.  
Empirical work specifically over Turkish FDI, was conducted by Kayam, S. and 
Hisarciklilar, M. (2009). They explore the determinants of Turkish outward FDI using a 
gravity model. In their model, they estimate not only the impact of traditional gravity 
variables but also openness, labor productivity, infrastructure, institutions and economic 
stability on FDI outflows from Turkey to 11 large importers of Turkish export over the 
period 1999-2005 years.  They found out that home and host country incomes, 
distance/transport costs, market size, openness, corruption and Turkey’s economic 
stability are the main determinants of Turkish FDI abroad. 
The most recent empirical work examining determinants of FDI in Turkey was done by 
Esiyok, B. (2010). He employs a knowledge-capital model and finds that joint national 
incomes, per capita difference, investment liberalization and the cost of exporting to 
   19 
Turkey have significant effects on FDI in Turkey. Furthermore, he finds other 
determinants of FDI in Turkey like the prospect of European Union membership, 
government stability, infrastructure, bilateral exchange rate, exchange rate volatility and 
openness to trade. Also, in the same paper, Esiyok finds positive correlation between 
exports and outward FDI stocks using the augmented gravity model. 
 
3.4 Market size and GDP 
Frequently, market size of the host country measured with GDP is considered to be one of 
important determinants of FDI inflows. The basic idea is that larger markets promise 
higher return to investment owing to more efficient utilization of resources and higher 
economies of scale.  Hara, M. & Razafimahefa, I.  (2003) found out that the size of the 
market is an important determinant of FDI in Japan.  
Imad Moosa (2005) finds GDP growth rate as one of determinants of FDI. He conducts 
extreme bound analysis to a sample of 18 MENA countries. His main conclusion is that 
countries with growing economies are more successful in attracting FDI.  There are also 
authors that even find prospective growing economies as an important factor for FDI 
inflow. For example,   Sakali, C. (2013) uses panel data to analyse the determinants of 
FDI in Bulgaria. Her empirical results suggest that prospects of growing economy are one 
of the important determinants of FDI in Bulgaria.  
GDP and GDP growth were also frequently used in gravity models as alternative to host 
country market size. The basic idea is that similarity of GDPs signifies the convergence in 
country size which motivates horizontal FDI.  According to Markusen, (1998), the 
production would be located in the country with larger market while the country with 
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smaller market will be served by exports when there is significant difference in size 
between these two countries. Markusen takes GDP as an alternative measure of a 
country’s market size. Furthermore, Lahreche-Revil, A. (2006) conducts the empirical 
investigation using gravity model to investigate where the impact of various definitions of 
corporate taxation on FDI. One of her findings was positive correlation of GDP (of both 
host and home country) with FDI flows.  
In the recent empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI), Blonigen, B. 
and Piger, J. (2011) use Bayesian statistical techniques to select a set of variables that are 
most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. They found out that traditional gravity 
variables including parent country’s GDP, parent-country’s per capita GDP, cultural 
distance factors, relative labor endowments, and regional trade agreements, are significant 
determinants of FDI.  Moreover, Bénassy-Quéré, A., Coupet, M., & Mayer, T. (2005) also 
confirm that the gravity model is a good and robust empirical description of capital 
investment movements and they found all standard gravity variables significant at the one 
per cent level, and correctly signed. Specifically, their findings show that the GDPs of 
both host and home countries have a positive impact on bilateral FDI.  
From available literature about market size and GDP in gravity model, the main 
conclusion is that GDP can be used as a proxy for market size of the country in gravity 
model and it should have positive effect on FDI flows.  
 
             3.5 Geographical distance and Transport Cost 
Based on proximity-concentration hypothesis supported by Brainyard (1997), physical 
distance can be used as a proxy for transport costs. This hypothesis predicts that firms are 
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more likely to expand their production horizontally because the longer geographical 
distance between home and host country the higher transport costs.  
Waldkrich examines FDI and physical distance relation where distance has negative effect 
on FDI. For example, in his paper “Vertical FDI? A host country prospective” measures 
distance between country capitals as proxy for trade and investment costs. In his other 
work, “The structure of multinational activity: evidence from Germany” (2010), distance 
again has negative effect on FDI. Findings of other authors like Blonigen and Davies 
(2005), Lahreche-Revil (2006) , Benassy-Quere (2005), also confirm the negative 
correlation between distance and FDI. Eicher, T. and Kang, J. (2003) study factors that 
determine the entry of multinational companies into host countries using market size, 
tariffs, transport costs as control factors. Their findings explain why direct investments are 
concentrated more in larger countries than in middle size countries. The study gives 
interesting results on tariffs and transport costs. The findings show that these costs are 
important in determining the entry of foreign investors. Depending on combinations of 
transport and tariffs costs, firms decide either to entry via direct investment or trade.  
Limao and Venables (2001) use different method according to which transport cost is the 
difference between f.o.b. (data for export as free on board) and c.i.f. (data of importer 
country for the same trade flow including costs, insurance and freight). This measure has 
an advantage over geographical distance as it captures the variance in the value of the 
transport cost over time. Gaulier, G., Mirza, D., Turban, S., and Zignago, S. uses the same 
measure for transport costs in their paper “International Transportation Costs around the 
World: a New CIF/FoB rates Dataset”, (2008).   Esiyok (2010) also considers this measure 
more appropriate for using in calculation of transport costs in Gravity Model because of 
its advantage over geographical distance.  
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            3.6 Political stability 
Political factors affect to the attractiveness of a host country to the foreign direct investors. 
Most of the literatures suggest that this effect is positive. There are a number of articles 
supporting importance of political stability in the country for foreign direct investors. For 
example, Buthe, T. & Milner, H. (2008) examine the effect of the political factors on the 
flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries focusing on the international 
trade agreement - GATT/QTO and preferred trade agreement (PTAs) – as an indicators of 
stable investment environment. They consider these international commitments more 
credible than domestic policy choices for measuring the degree of investment environment 
of the country including its political stability. Their statistical analyses provide strong 
empirical support for their central hypotheses about the effect of international 
institutionalized commitments on FDI flows. Particularly, they find out that belonging to 
the WTO increases inward FDI, and the inward FDI increases when the number of PTAs 
to which a country is a party is greater.  This means, developing countries attract more 
FDI when joining to international agreements. Also, it is important to mention about this 
work that when authors include domestic policy measures in their model, they still find 
that WTO and PTA’s have significant positive effect on FDI inflows. 
Controversial empirical work was conducted by Haksoon, K. (2010) where he investigated 
the relationship among foreign direct investment and political stability analyzing the 
country-level FDI flows, FDI inward performance and political stability measures. He 
finds out that countries with high level of corruption and low level of democracy have 
higher FDI inflows and FDI inward performance. 
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The general conclusion from available literature about effect of political stability on FDI 
flows is that growing political stability should have positive effect on FDI flows in 
emerging markets but negative effect on already developed countries.  
 
 
               3.7 Institutional framework 
Institutional framework has always been one of important factors which matters to 
business and organization when entering a new market. In their empirical analyses 
different authors use different proxies to account for institutional framework. For example 
Esiyok (2010) use bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between Turkey and home countries 
as a proxy for investment liberalization which is intuitively correlated with institutional 
framework. Another author, Carr (2001), uses an index to control for investment 
liberalization.  
In their discussion paper, Busse, M. and Hefeker, C. (2005) study linkages between 
institutions, political risk and foreign direct investment inflows. They collect the data from 
83 developing countries for the time period of 1984 – 2003 to conduct their empirical 
study. During their analyses, they find indicators for law as very significant determinants 
of foreign investment flows. Additional study provided by Saul Estrin & Milica Uvalic 
(2013) indicates on importance of institutional quality and prospects of EU membership in 
attracting foreign direct investment in Balkans. These authors use two measures to control 
relationship between institutional background and FDI, namely investment freedom and a 
quality of property rights protection index derived from the Heritage Foundation’s Index 
of Economic Freedom.  
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Brindusa Anghel (2005) argues that countries with stronger institutional framework better 
attract foreign direct investment than those with weaker. Anghel made empirical analyses 
of cross-section data and found many aspect of institutional framework (protection of 
property rights, corruption, significant, business restrictiveness and others). 
Bissoon, O. (2011) comes to similar conclusions when examining the effect of 
institutions’ quality on determining FDI in a host country.  The main finding is that 
governments can play an important role in promoting FDI via appropriate institutional 
reforms. Moreover, according to Bissoon, an improvement in institutional quality would 
increase state’s income level which has indirect positive effect on the level of FDI inflows 
of the country. Earlier, this hypothesis was supported by Rajan, R (2004) who also was 
emphasizing importance of government policies in creating appropriate environment for 
FDI.  
Mike Pournarakis and Nikos C. Varsakelis (2004) find the market size and the degree of 
internationalization of the host economy as important factors explaining the uneven 
allocation of foreign direct investment in the economies. However, they also provide 
empirical evidence that institutional factors play significant role in explaining the 
behaviour of foreign direct investment flows in the country. According them, these factors 
strengthen location advantages and make the economy more attractive to foreign 
investors.  
Cristina Jude & Gregory Levieuge (2013) investigate the effect of foreign direct 
investment on economic growth conditional on the institutional quality of the host county. 
They wanted to show hoe the institutional quality causes FDI knowledge spillovers. Using 
sample of 94 developing countries over 1984-2009 period, they tested their hypotheses 
and found significant correlation between FDI inflow and institutional quality indicators. 
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Therefore, their final conclusion is that the institutional framework must be improved to 
attract more and more foreign direct investors.   
 
               3.8 Bilateral Treaties 
There are a lot of empirical works on effect of bilateral treaties on foreign direct 
investment. Mary Hallward-Driemeier (2003) provides empirical analyses of correlation 
between bilateral treaties and foreign direct investment flows. She finds out that the more 
treaties are ratified the higher is volume of FDI in a corresponding host country. The paper 
also indicates that these treaties are complementary to other factors like institutional 
quality of the country. This leads to further finding that ratified treaties increases the 
responsibility of local institutions leading to higher institutional quality of the country.  
Busse, M., Königer, J. and Nunnenkamp, P. (2008) use larger data sample to test the same 
correlation. They employ a gravity-type model to test their hypotheses including 
instrumental variable approach during their research. Their findings indicate on significant 
effect of bilateral treaties on foreign direct investment inflow. Mina, W. (2010) provides 
empirical analyses of both short and long term effect bilateral treaties on foreign direct 
investments in Gulf region. He employs GMM estimation on panel data and finds 
investment treaties less important than other type of bilateral treaties. In addition, his 
paper indicates on difference of bilateral treaties’ effects that are dependent on the level of 
county’s income. 
Christian Bellak (2013) also examines the effect of bilateral treaties on foreign direct 
investment flows but he uses meta-analysis. His findings show substantial between-study 
heterogeneity indicating on substantial effect of bilateral treaties on foreign direct 
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investment flow.  Additional work providing meta-analyses on this subject is a study 
provided by Lars P. Feld and Jost Henrich Heckemeyer (2009). They use a broad set of 
meta-regression estimators to selecting the most appropriate ones to their analyses.  For 
them it is important to find the best solution, namely, meta-analysis which has real 
contribution to the study. High emphases are put on studying the effect of variables 
moderating tax differentials and tax rates set under signed bilateral treaties.  
There is also a whole book about the effect of treaties on foreign direct investment by Karl 
P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (2009). Specifically, they study the effect of doubles 
taxation treaties and bilateral investment treaties on FDI. Their main finding is that these 
two treaties create investor friendly environment which eventually leads to the flow of 
foreign direct investment. They also note that these findings are still debatable. Therefore 
they are still subject of further research. This statement has real reasons behind it at least 
because some of experts in this field doubt the real impact of bilateral treaties in foreign 
direct investment flow.  Also there are evidences from economies of some African 
countries. For example, Nigeria attracts one of highest foreign direct investment flow in 
Africa because of its oil resources. This means that foreign direct investment flows to the 
countries with natural resources and large markets rather to those with higher number of 
signed bilateral treaties.  
 
               3.9 Labour market 
There is abundant number of literature on the effect of labour market on foreign direct 
investment. In the study conducted by Ranjan, V. and Agrawal, G. (2011), labor cost is 
taken as one of control variables.  Ranjan and Agrawal study the determinants of foreign 
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direct investment inflow specifically in BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
The employ random effect model and find labor cost as one of significant variables in the 
model.  Meanwhile, Parcon, H. (2008) studies this subject focusing on labour market 
regulations. According him, labour market has two effects on foreign direct investment 
inflow that are opposite to each other. Higher cost of labour has negative effect on foreign 
direct investment flows but higher cost implies higher quality of labour which has positive 
effect on investment flows. Therefore, the main finding of the study is that there is certain 
degree of labour market regulations which makes the country attractive to foreign 
investors. And there is certain level of these regulations that will have negative effect on 
foreign investment flow. Also, according him, the effect of regulations depends on a 
country and sector where foreign direct investment flows.   
A different empirical work is provided by Delbecque,V., Méjean, I., and Patureau, L. 
(2007) that study the impact of labor market institutions on foreign direct investment 
flows focusing on French firms. They employ a discrete choice model to estimate 
variables of individual foreign direct investment decisions. Delbecque,V. and his co-
authors build their model based on the new trade theory of Krugman with elements of 
other models covering labor market. As a result of their estimations, they find that the 
labor market has significant effect on foreign direct investment decisions. The effect 
varies depending on the type of labor market institutions. According to the authors, stricter 
labor regulations have negative effect on firms’ decisions but the most important 
determinant of foreign direct investment is the demand in in the market.  
Despite abundance of empirical works on the effect of labour market on foreign direct 
investment, still most of these papers have lots of limitations. Pflüger, M., Blien, U., 
Möller, J. and Moritz, M. (2010) test different theoretical aspects covering the correlation 
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between foreign direct investment and labour market. After diligent reviews of some of 
most relevant literature, they conclude that many of these works have a number of 
limitations. Therefore, new approach for the research of FDI and labour market 
relationship is needed.  
There are also empirical works that study the opposite effect: the impact of foreign direct 
investment on labour income. For example, Tintin, C. (2012) studies this subject using 
panel data analyses over fourteen OECD countries for the time period between 1990 and 
2010. He focuses on labour income as a proxy. Specifically, he studies the impact of 
foreign direct investment on different classes of labour. Tintin finds out that foreign direct 
investment has positive effect on labour income (on minimum and maximum wages) in 
OECD countries. Similar work is provided by Pandya, S. (2010). She focused on demand 
for foreign direct investment in host countries. According to her findings, foreign direct 
investment preferences depend on its impact on income. As foreign firms increased wages 
for skilled workers, support for these firms increase as labour skills become higher in a 
host economy. Using data from eighteen Latin American countries, the authors finds 
support for her hypotheses.  
 
4. Conceptual framework and methodology 
4.1 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  
I employ a knowledge-capital framework (Markusen et al., 1996) to find FDI determinants 
in Turkey. I follow Esiyok (2010) who covered the main determinants of FDI inflows in 
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Turkey that had not been covered by previous authors like Kayam (2009) or Central Bank 
of Turkey (2013).   
Hypothesis #1: Political stability in the country attracts higher volume of FDI.  
 
Political stability in Turkey had improved since 2002 due to active policies of the 
new government. This fact maybe is one of the main determinants of FDI inflow to 
Turkey in the last 10 years. [On other hand increasing disturbance in the region 
(like “Arab spring”) may deteriorate political stability environment of the country].  
A number of authors support the fact that political stability has positive effect on 
FDI inflow. Buthe, T. & Milner, H. (2008) consider international institutionalized 
commitments (like WTO, PTAs) as guarantee of political stability in the country. 
They found out that developing countries attract more FDI when joining to 
international agreements. Bissoon, O. (2011) finds positive effect between 
institutions’ quality on FDI inflow of a host country.  I am going to use World 
Bank’s political stability index as Haksoon, K. (2010) when investigating the 
relationship among foreign direct investment and political stability. It measures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism. Estimates of this measure range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong political stability) points.  From the data for political stability index in 
Turkey we see slight improvement in index since 2000 years but still the index has 
a negative sign. This means that although political situation in Turkey for last 10 
years has improved, its political environment is still not as good as in western 
European countries. 
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Figure 7. Political stability in Turkey between 1996 and 2012 
 
 
Soucre: based on data compiled from World Bank Governance Indicators 
 
Also, I take into account controversial empirical findings of Haksoon, K. (2010). 
This means, that maybe improving political stability of Turkey is attracting more 
and more FDI but because it is not as good as in Western Europe, it may be also 
positive signal for foreign investors. Therefore, The expected effect of political 
stability variable can be both positive and negative.  
 
Hypothesis #2 
Higher level of education attracts FDI into the country  
 
Countries with a high level of education tend to attract higher levels of foreign 
investment than those with low level of education. There can be found several 
studies supporting this hypothesis. For example, Akin, M. & Vlad, V. (2011) find 
out that superior education is important determinant in FDI. From the most recent 
works on correlation between education and FDI are papers of Donaubauer, J. 
Herzer, D. (2013) and Bahmaid , S. ( 2013). Donaubauer, J. and Herzer, D. (2013) 
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flows to host countries in Latin America where schooling and education appears to 
be inadequate. One of their findings was the positive correlation between FDI and 
education. Similar findings are made by Bahmaid , S. ( 2013). She finds that 
investments in educational sector in India increase FDI inflows of the country.  
Based on made research and general intuition, the expected effect of education on 
FDI is positive. In my paper, I take the share of GDP dedicated to the Ministry of 
Nation Education as a proxy for educational level assuming that every invested 
penny to education improves its level.  
 
Hypothesis #3:  Similarity between countries sizes increases FDI between them 
 
Production would be located in the country with larger market while the country 
with smaller market will be served by exports when there is significant difference 
in size between these two countries. GDP can be taken as a measure of a country’s 
market size. Hence, as similarity of GDPs signifies the convergence in country size 
which motivates horizontal FDI, the expected sign of the variable is positive 
(Markusen, 1998) 
Similarity index is calculated using formula derived by Helpman, E. (1987):  
Simindex=    
     
           
  - 
      
           
  , where “h” stands for Turkey and 
“i” for other countries.  
Simindex ϵ (0;0.5). Values close to 0.5 shows high similarity in country size; 
values closet to 0 – high difference in country size.  
This formula gives similarity index which will be used to get similarity: 
Similarity=lnSimindex.  
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Hypothesis #4: Higher trade costs of firms motivate them to switch to FDI.  
 
Waldkrich (2003) measures distance between country capitals as proxy for trade 
and investment costs. According to him, it should be included in the model since it 
fits well for gravity-type models.  However, taking just distance as a proxy for 
trade cost would not be sufficient therefore as Esiyok (2010) I decided to include 
CIF/FOB ratios as a proxy for transportation/trade costs. More support for this 
choice of ratio, I find in an empirical paper “International Transportation Costs 
around the World: a New CIF/FoB rates Dataset”, by of Gaulier, G., Mirza, D., 
Turban, S., and Zignago, S.   They find CIF/FOB ratio similar to alternative proxy 
measures of transport cost but they highlight the advantage of it in capturing 
variation over time and products.  
 
Hypothesis #5: Better institutional framework of a country would increase its 
inward FDI 
 
Intuitively, firms prefer to work in well-known environment than in totally 
unknown. This means that rule of law/ or law enforcement, institutional 
framework, and business/economic environment of a host country matter when a 
foreign firm wants to enter to a host country. Therefore, it is important to include 
in the model at least one of these mentioned factors. Esiyok (2010) included a 
variable for investment liberalization (in Turkey) using bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) between Turkey and home countries as a proxy.  Carr (2001) also used an 
index to control for investment liberalization.  
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I decided to include a variable for the law enforcement/rule of law motivated by 
the empirical work on determinants of FDI in Balkan countries by Saul Estrin & 
Milica Uvalic (2013). During their research, Estrin and Uvalic found institutional 
quality and prospects of EU membership as important determinants of foreign 
direct investment in Balkans. These authors used two measures to control 
relationship between institutional background and FDI, namely investment 
freedom and a quality of property rights protection index derived from the 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.  
In my empirical analyses I use Rule of Law index derived from World Bank 
governance indices. The index reflects to what extent market actors are confident 
about the law enforcement and abide by the rules of society. Specifically, the index 
shows the quality of how contract terms and property rights are respected in the 
country. (It also includes the quality of the police and courts activity, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.) Estimate of Rule of Law ranges from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong), hence the higher the figure the higher the degree of Rule of 
Law. Therefore the expected sign of the variable is positive if the index estimates 




   4.2 Methodology 
I am going to specify a panel model with cross section dimensions (home countries 
“i”,i=N number of countries,  and the host  country Turkey “h” and time dimension “t”, K 
years, to test the above mentioned hypotheses.  
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The model will be specified as a gravity model as it contains variables such as trade cost 
between two countries and market size of two countries  
 
lnFDIhit= β1PSTABht + β2lnSimiht+β3TCi+β4EDUht+ β5LAWht +εi, where 
 
lnFDI – log of inward FDI data to Turkey 
PSTAB - political stability of a host country at time “t” 
LnSimIndex – log of similarity index of GDPs of a country (i) and the host country  
TC - trade costs of exports from country (i) to the host country (Turkey). 
EDU – education level of host country at time “t”   
LAW - rule of law in the host country (Turkey) 
 
I want to estimate the determinants of FDI in Turkey with larger data sample and specific 
time period of 2001-2012, when a lot of foreign investments were attracted to the 
economy. Thus I will be able to test if similarity Index, political stability and trade cost are 
indeed one of significant FDI determinants in Turkey.  In addition, I add two new 
variables - education level and rule of law - based on my literature review which emphasis 
the significance of education and law enforcement level as FDI determinants.  
Since my data represents both cross sectional and time series data, I will employ panel 
data analyses. First I want to use pooled OLS model which pools all the observations in 
OLS regression implicitly assuming that the coefficients are the same for all the 
individuals. But estimates from pooled OLS regression will be biased and inconsistent  
once pooled OLS neglects heterogeneity across individuals so that the effects unique to 
every individual will be absorbed by error term. Therefore, fixed and random effects 
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models will be employed further in my estimations to conduct a panel data analyses. 
These models are especially useful when analyzed number of countries is larger than the 
observed time period as in my panel data (25 countries for 11 year period). 
 
 
5. Data description 
Following my hypotheses, I collected the required data that will be used in my 
estimations. My observations will cover only time period between 2001 and 2012 
featuring top 25 countries that have directly invested in Turkey during this time period. It 
includes both OECD and non OECD countries that were not covered by previous studies 
including Esiyok’s. Countries included in the data are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK, Canada, 
Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Norway, Switzerland, USA, Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Russian Federation, Bahrain, Kuwait,  Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Azerbaijan. 
For the purpose of my research, I use knowledge capital model to estimate FDI 
determinants in Turkey using Political Stability, Similarity, Trade cost, Education level 
and Control of Law as control variables. Similarity index (LnSimIndex) was derived from 
log of SimIndex=    
     
           
  - 
      
           
   . Total GDPs (in US dollars) for 
each observed country (and Turkey) was extracted from United Nations statistics division 
(UNSTAT,unstats.un.org). After the calculation, the log of SimIndex was extracted to get 
final data for lnSimIndex variable. The data for Trade Cost variable was calculated as 
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cif/fob using import and export data of home country to the host country (Turkey) 
extracted from UN Comtrade databse (comtrade.un.org).  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  TC LnSimIndex LnFDI PolStab Educ Law 
nbr.val 348 348 348 348 348 348 
nbr.null 1 0 73 0 0 0 
nbr.na 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Min 0 -3.187 0 -1.192 1.68 -0.0609 
Max 34.93 -0.693 8.65 -0.597 2.88 0.1571 
Range 34.93 2.494 8.65 0.595 1.2 0.218 
Sum 982.68 -414.498 1223.57 -299.454 825.92 22.7795 
median 1.48 -0.899 3.91 -0.8445 2.35 0.0804 
Mean 2.82 -1.191 3.52 -0.8605 2.373 0.0655 
SE.mean 0.25 0.034 0.13 0.0084 0.017 0.0037 
CI.mean 0.5 0.066 0.26 0.0165 0.033 0.0073 
Var 22.09 0.392 6.04 0.0245 0.096 0.0048 
std.dev 4.7 0.626 2.46 0.1565 0.309 0.0692 
coef.var 1.66 -0.526 0.7 -0.1818 0.13 1.0573 
 
The data for the share of GDP dedicated to the Ministry of Nation Education (taken as a 
proxy for education level in Turkey) is extracted from the report of the National Education 
Statistics of the Ministry of Nation Education (www.meb.gov.tr).  
The data for Political Stability and the Rule of law indicators for the host country was 
extracted from World Bank Governance indicators (WGI). It is a research dataset that 
summarizes the views on the quality of governance gathered from several survey 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental and international organizations and even private 
firms. The data is provided by various survey respondents (enterprise, citizen and expert) 
from different countries.  
Thus, the Political stability index reflects the probability of the government destabilization 
that may happen as a result of unconstitutional or violent actions. Therefore, it should be a 
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good indicator to control for political stability of the host country (Turkey) over the last 10 
years. 
Rule of law reflects the extent of market actors’ confidence about the law enforcement and 
the level of their abiding by the rules of society. Specifically, the index shows the quality 
of how contract terms and property rights are respected in the country. (It also includes the 
quality of the police and courts activity, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.) 
The dependent variable lnFDI is log of inward FDI data (reported in US dollars ) to 
Turkey from all 25 countries present in the sample. The data was extracted from OECD 
statistics office (stats.oecd.org). 
 
 
6.  Empirical results 
To conduct my empirical calculations I used R software. R is a platform for statistical 
computing (linear and nonlinear modelling, classical statistical tests, time-series analysis, 
clustering and other tools) and graphics developed at Bell Laboratories by John Chambers 
and his colleagues. 
As a first step, I used pooled OLS model for my estimations, then continued with 
estimations of Random Effect and Fixed effect models. Following estimations, I 
conducted different tests (Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, Hausman test) to check 
which model is the most suitable for the estimations. This was followed by other tests to 
check consistency of derived results. 
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POOLED OLS 
Pooled OLS model ignores panel structure of the data. Namely, the model takes all the 
data from time series and cross sectional dimensions as the combinations of separate 
observations.   
                 
Pooled OLS model brings more efficient estimations giving more relevant and unbiased 
estimates. It helps to test more sophisticated models allowing less restrictive assumptions. 
Panel data sets make it possible to control for individual heterogeneity. They are able to 
identify and estimate the regression effects that cannot be found either in cross-section and 
time-series data. Pooled OLS model is able to detect dynamic behavior of variables in 
panel sets. However, if there is no mean to control the regression effects in the panel data 
then estimations from pooled OLS model will be biased and inconsistent.  
In short, when we have a Panel data we are usually interested in heterogeneity across 
individuals, keeping time dynamics. Now we would like to understand the differences in 
behaviour across individuals. Thus, our general framework takes the form of: 
       
     
       
Where heterogeneity or individual effect is captured by   
    Thus, if zi contains only 
constant term, OLS provides consistent and efficient estimates. As a next step, I run the 
Pooled OLS in R that takes the following form, 
lnFDIhit= β0 + β1PSTABht + β2lnSimiht+β3TCi+β4EDUht+ β5LAWht +εi,  
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and I get the following estimations depicted in the table below (Table 2): 
Table 2. Estimations of Pooled OLS model 
 
Pooled OLS model   
  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
 (Intercept) -2.8882 1.0381 -2.78 0.0057 ** 
LnSimIndex 0.0135 0.1946 0.07 0.9445 
 TC -0.0785 0.026 -3.02 0.0027 ** 
PolStab 2.8602 1.0756 2.66 0.0082 ** 
Educ 3.9773 0.596 6.67 1E-10 *** 
Law -5.1347 2.2621 -2.27 0.0238 * 
R-Squared     0.161     
Adj. R-Squared 0.158     
           
The results show that all the explanatory variables are strongly significant, except the 
similarity index. The most significant parameter is the one for the level of education – at 
99% confidence level. Parameters of trade cost and political stability are significant at 95 
% confidence level, and rule of law - at 90 % confidence level. The signs for political 
stability and level of education are positive and for trade cost is negative as expected. The 
surprising is the sign for Rule of Law which is negative.  
R-Squared is 0.161. Hence this model explains 16.1 % of the variation in foreign direct 
investment inflow to Turkey. If we look at adjusted R-squared which is 0.158, then the fit 
will be almost the same – the model explain 15.8 %  (very close to R-squared) of the 
variation in FDI inflow to Turkey. 
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RANDOM EFFECT MODEL 
Random effect model is the model where the constant term is random assuming that the 
individual effects (that are captured by constant) are not depended on independent 
variables. The intercept in this model (which acts here as a random variable) represents the 
sum of the means and corresponding error term.  
This model suits more to the cases when the number of observed units is large and the 
regressed variables are time-invariant.  Thus, Random effect model will give more reliable 
results than fixed effect model when there is the sample data (time invariant) with large 
population. When the estimated parameters are random variables, the model saves certain 
degrees of freedom. 







The drawback of the random effect model is that it ignores any correlation of error terms 
from all units of cross section with other independent variables. Empirical analyses show 
that the opposite effect has higher probability to happen. Therefore, estimations from 
 
Random Effect model   
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept) -2.5456 1.0324 -2.47 0.0142 * 
LnSimIndex 0.145 0.4307 0.34 0.7366   
TC -0.1145 0.0351 -3.26 0.0012 ** 
PolStab 2.8696 0.8389 3.42 0.0007 *** 
Educ 3.9395 0.4668 8.44 9.1E-16 *** 
Law -4.93 1.7713 -2.78 0.0057 ** 
R-Squared 0.232     
Adj. R-Squared 0.228     
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random effects model will be biased if the opposite effect take place as the basic 
assumption of no correlation is violated.  
Results of estimation (Table 3) show that all variables are significant except similarity 
index (as in the case of pooled OLS model). None of the variables was excluded from the 
model. Hence all variables are uncorrelated with disturbances. Random effect model gave 
different sizes and significance of estimates but same signs to the estimates as in pooled 
OLS model. Trade cost and political stability have less effect on FDI in this model than in 
pooled OLS model, while the effect of institutional framework and expenditure on 
education is higher. The most significant parameters are for variables of education level 
(at 99% confidence level) and political stability (at 99% confidence level). Parameters for 
Trade cost and Rule of Law are significant at 95 % confidence level. As in estimated 
results of pooled OLS model, positive signs of political stability and level of education 
were expected.  However negative signs of institutional framework (rule of law) and trade 
cost were not expected.  
The standard errors decreased in comparison to pooled OLS model, implying that the 
estimates from random effects model more efficient. R-Squared is 0.232 Hence this model 
explains 23.2 % of the response data. If we look at adjusted R-squared which is 0.228, 
then the fit will be almost the same – 22.8 % (very close to R-squared.) As R squared in 
the random effect model is higher than in pooled OLS, we may say that Random effects 
model fits better to the estimations than pooled OLS model. However, to confirm our 
assumption we need to conduct the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test which will be 
provided later.  
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FIXED EFFECT MODEL 
Fixed effect model as well as random effect model is usually used when the observed 
number of countries is large while the observed time period is short. The fixed effect 
model will give more efficient results if the data of the whole population is available. The 
model itself allows individual specific effect to be correlated with independent variables 
demeaning these repressors by within transformation to remove    : 
              
         (      )                   
Panel data is usually known for its heterogeneity problem. It can be solved if we remove 
   as assumption of no correlation between     and     will not be needed anymore. 
However, if     and     are not correlated then the fixed effect model will not give 
efficient estimates. The key advantage of the fixed effect model is that the time-invariant 
variables are not included.  
In my case, fixed effect model is probably the most suitable estimator as all data in my 
dataset is varying in time. As a next step I did estimations in R using the following 
formula and got the results shown Table 4.  
Fixed effect model eliminated the unobservable effects in the model effects since 
estimation within this model is based on within-panel over-time variation. It can be simply 
explained / shown in the following formula: 
        
          , where E[ci|Xi]  0, 
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  =  
   is a group-specific constant term that contains all observable effects where zi is 
unobserved but correlated with xit. 
 
Table 4. Estimations of Fixed Effects model 
 
Fixed Effects model 
   Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
   
     LnSimIndex 0.9154 1.0781 0.85 0.39646 
 TC -0.1334 0.0403 -3.31 0.00105 ** 
PolStab 2.8573 0.8401 3.4 0.00076 *** 
Educ 3.8549 0.4767 8.09 1.3E-14 *** 
Law -4.7912 1.7774 -2.7 0.0074 ** 
R-Squared 0.248     
Adj. R-Squared 0.224     
 
Results of estimation show that all estimates are significant except similarity index (as in 
all previously estimated models). Although signs of estimates haven’t changed, their sizes 
and significance in the fixed effect model are different from sizes and significance of 
estimates in the random effect model. Effects of all variables on explanatory variable are 
higher in the fixed effect model than in Random effect model.    
The most significant parameters are those for variables like education level (at 99% 
confidence level) and political stability (at 99% confidence level). Parameters for Trade 
cost and Rule of Law are significant at 95 % confidence level. Also, the standard errors 
(for significant estimates) in fixed effect model are less compared to standard errors of 
estimates in the random effect model. This means that the estimates from fixed effects 
model are more efficient than estimates from random effect and pooled OLS models.  
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Positive signs of political stability and expenditures on education were expected as well as 
negative sign of trade costs.  Increasing political stability, higher level of education and 
decreasing trade cost indeed should have positive effect on foreign direct investment 
inflow. However negative sign of institutional framework (rule of law) was not expected 
as it should be as one of important factors for investors (the same results were obtained in 
previous models – in Pooled OLS and Random effect models). However, there is also 
other point of view according which investors sometimes benefit weak institutional 
framework as they find it as an opportunity to enter the market without strict legal 
barriers.  
R-Squared is 0.248. Hence this model explains 24.8 % of the variation in foreign direct 
investment inflow to Turkey. If we look at adjusted R-squared which is 0.224., then the fit 
will be a bit less – in this case, the model explains 22.8 % of the variation in FDI inflow to 
Turkey. R squared in the fixed effect model is higher than R-squared in Random effect 
model and hence than in pooled OLS. Therefore, based on results for goodness of fit, we 
may say that fixed effects model fits better to the estimations than Random effect model 
and pooled OLS model. However, adjusted R-squared is less a bit (for 0.4 %) than in 
Random model,  which brings us to opposite conclusion – random effects model fits to the 
estimations better than fixed effect model. Nevertheless, to check these assumptions we 
need to conduct the Hausman test which will also be provided later.  
 
Model Choice 
The results for fixed effect tests show that there are significant panel effects, specifically 
in this case – fixed effects model better fits for my estimations than pooled OLS model.  
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In addition, I conduct Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier for random effects where the 
null hypothesis is that variances across entities are zero. This means that there is no 
significant difference across units (i.e. no panel effect) hence pooled OLS model is better. 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier for random effects just confirm the results of testing 
for fixed effects: there are significant panel effects in the model therefore random effects 
model better fits my calculations than simple pooled OLS model.  
At last, I conduct Hausman test to find out which of models (fixed or random) better fits to 
my estimations. The results of the test show that random effect model is better choice than 
fixed effect model. But the random effects model suits more to the cases when the number 
of observed units is large and the regressed variables are time-invariant. In this paper, the 
used data was large it was varying over time.  Hence, the random effect model will not 
give more reliable results than fixed effect model.  
Contrary to the random effects model, the fixed effect is most suitable when observed 
number of countries is large while the observed time period is short and the variables are 
time-variant. Therefore, it is more reasonable to employ the fixed effect model in my 




Cross-sectional dependence/contemporaneous correlation 
Although cross-sectional error dependence used to be considered in only spatial models, it 
had recently become important issue also in panel data.  The availability of data has been 
growing over time and nowadays usually panel includes lots of information across 
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countries, industries, sectors (and etc.), where cross section dimensions is larger than time 
series. Cross sectional correlation of errors can be ignored (once it is present in the data) 
as this can bring to some problems in analysis of estimations. It is present almost in all 
panel data from economics.  
Usually, cross sectional correlation of errors can be caused by different factors: it can be a 
result of omitted spatial effects or it is just caused because of exogenous common shocks. 
In fixed and random models estimators, presence of cross-sectional dependence can lead 
to wrong inference or even inconsistent estimators. It depends on nature of the error. For 
example, it must be found out if the source of generating the cross sectional dependence is 
correlated with independent variables or not.   
Thus, it is important to test if the cross-sectional correlation is present in my data or not. 
Therefore I ran Pasaran CD test to check whether the residuals are correlated across 
entities. Under the null hypothesis in the Pasaran CD test, residuals across entities are not 
correlated. The results of the test show that the null hypothesis is rejected at 99 percent 
confidence level (see appendix) Thus, there is cross sectional dependence in my data. 
 
Testing for serial correlation 
One of the assumptions of regression analyses is that error terms are uncorrelated - 
independent from one another (E(εiεj) = 0 for all i ≠ j). If this assumption is violated, 
alternative estimation model should be employed compromising on the efficiency of the 
estimates. The most common case of such violation occurs with time series data in the 
form of serial correlation. In time series this occurs when the error in period has an effect 
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on the error in a subsequent period. If serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors exists, 
estimation would be less efficient and standard error will be biased. 
Panel data contains both time series and cross sectional data, therefore serial correlation 
can occur in that data as well. Because my data is a panel data I decided to check for 
existence of serial correlation in my estimations. Therefore I used Breusch-
Godfrey/Wooldridge test to check for serial correlation where the null hypothesis is that 
there is no serial correlation in the data. The results of the tests showed that the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected 99 percent confidence level (see appendix). 
Therefore it can be inferred that my estimations are less efficient and standard error are 
biased. 
 
Testing for heteroskadesticity 
Even if heteroskadesticity is present in the estimations, the coefficient estimates in the 
ordinary least squares will not be biased but estimates of its variance.  Therefore, the 
variance and standard errors of ordinary least squares estimates will possibly be above or 
below the population variance. Hence, although regression analysis of heteroskedastic 
data gives unbiased estimates for correlation between the dependent and independent 
variable, the biased standard errors will lead to probably wrong inferences and thus wrong 
final results. Considering these issues I used the Breusch-Pagan test to check for 
heteroskadesticity in my estimation where null hypothesis is that the estimation is 
homoscedastic (and alternative hypothesis tells that the estimation I heteroskedastic). The 
results of the test show that the null hypothesis (homoscedasticity) is rejected with p-value 
= 0.07974 - heteroskadesticity is detected in the estimation. Hence our estimations of 
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coefficients are not biased but there is bias in standard errors that may lead to wrong 
inferences.  
 
Controlling for Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
In order to account for the problems that were found in my estimations, I used robust 
covariance matrix with “arellano” which gives both no serial correlation and 
heteroskadesticity consistent coefficients. After conducting the testing, all independent 
variables were found significant except similarity index.  
 
Table 5. Controlling for Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
 
 
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)   
     
  
LnSimIndex 0.9154      1.3491     0.68           0.49795       
TC -0.1334      0.0214    -6.23 0.00000000149364  *** 
PolStab 2.8573      0.8757     3.26           0.00122  ** 
Educ 3.8549      0.5159     7.47 0.00000000000079  *** 
Law -4.7912      1.4134    -3.39           0.00079  *** 
 
1 % increase in similarity index will increase foreign direct investment in Turkey by 0.916 
%. However the estimate is not significant at all. This means that similarity in income of 
economies does not play significant role in FDI inflow to the host country.  
The effect of Trade cost on foreign direct investment is negative. If trade cost increases by 
1 ratio it will result in decrease of FDI by 13.34%. The estimate is significant at 99% 
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confidence level. Such result was not expected and therefore the reason behind it must be 
identified in the next chapter.  
The political stability is represented as a range between -2.5 and 2.5, therefore the 
probability of this range will equal 100% in total (cumulative distribution function). From 
this we interpret our estimation as follows: if there is one positive standard deviation 
change in political stability index, the foreign direct investment will increase by 2.86%. 
The estimate is significant at 95% confidence level. 
Similar to political stability index, the rule of law index is also represented as a range 
between -2.5 and 2.5, therefore the probability of this range will equal 100% in total 
(cumulative distribution function).  Thus I have similar interpretation as for political 
stability index: one positive standard deviation change in rule of law will cause foreign 
direct investment in Turkey to decrease by 4.7912 %. The estimate is significant at 99% 
confidence level. 
At last, 1 % rise in level of education in Turkey will attract 3.85 % more FDI to the 
country. The estimate is significant at 99% confidence level. This finding is in line with 
my hypothesis which was derived from empirical findings of other authors. This implies 




Estimate of political stability was found significant at 95% confidence level. It has 
positive effect in foreign direct investment inflow which is in line with my first 
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hypothesis.  This means that increasing political stability in Turkey over last 10 years has 
been attracting foreign direct investors. Esiyok also had found positive relationship 
between political stability and FDI inflow. Therefore, political stability is one of important 
determinants of FDI inflow in Turkey.  This implies that for the foreign investors political 
stability in the host country plays significant role in decision making. Although some 
authors like Haksoon (2010) may argue that political instability is a good green signal to 
invest for foreign investors at some point, there is no enough proof for such assumption. 
To the contrary, empirical analysis including my estimations and also general sense /or 
economic intuition indicates to significance of increasing political stability for attracting 
investment.  
Education level also has been found significant at 99 % of confidence level and it has 
positive effect on dependent variable as it was expected. Therefore, second hypothesis is 
also confirmed. This implies that improving education attracts more foreign investors to 
the host country – Turkey. This finding is in line with findings of other authors like Akin, 
M. & Vlad, V. (2011), Donaubauer, J. Herzer, D. (2013) and Bahmaid , S. ( 2013).  This 
finding is important also because it was not taken into account neither by Esiyok (2010) or 
other known authors doing empirical analyses of FDI determinants in Turkey.  
After conducting all necessary estimations, I didn’t find similarity index significant.  
Esiyok (2010) also had the same result for similarity index. Therefore similarity in 
national incomes between home countries and the host country (Turkey) has no 
real/significant impact on foreign direct inflow in Turkey. Hence, my third hypothesis was 
not confirmed.  
Next hypothesis was that increasing trade cost between home country and host country 
motivated firms to switch to foreign direct investment. It also had not been confirmed, as 
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the opposite correlation was found. Contrary to the findings of Esiyok, the trade cost of 
exporting to Turkey has negative effect on FDI inflow to Turkey. Esiyok’s explanation of 
positive correlation was that once multinational enterprises find trade cost of exporting 
very high, they decide to establish their branch/factory in the host country (it is one of 
reasons given by Esiyok).  Different effect in my finding is probably caused by the use of 
different time period and larger number of countries used in the sample. There is also 
good explanation behind this finding – some foreign investors lose interest in the host 
country as trade cost between these countries becomes higher. This explanation doesn’t 
contradict to the findings of Esiyok. We should take into account the differences in the 
industries and business/trade politics of foreign direct investors. Multinational enterprises 
may establish a factory in Turkey for various reasons: it can establish it to export produced 
product to a third country or back to the home country. In the first case, Esiyok’s findings 
are more suitable: when a firm finds higher cost exporting its goods to Turkey, it decides 
to establish a fabric to produce its products for local market (Turkey) or to export them 
further to the east (or west). But if the firm wants to establish a fabric in Turkey to import 
its products to the home country for various reasons - to sell them directly or use them as 
input for its production at home – then probably higher cost of trade between a home 
country and a host country will decrease interest of this firm in investing for a particular 
country. This issue should be the subject of further research where foreign direct 
investment flow will be analyzed on firms’ level rather than on country level.  
At last, it was found out that institutional framework (the rule of law) plays significant 
role in determining foreign direct investment inflow to Turkey. However the finding was 
surprising, the effect was opposite - better institutional framework/rule of war makes the 
country less attractive to foreign investors. These findings are not in line with my last 
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hypothesis. Meanwhile it is important to mention that Esiyok (2010) took political 
stability and institutional framework as one variable, contrary to what I did. I have two 
different indices because in my paper institutional framework is more about law 
enforcement, property rights, copyrights and business code while political stability is 
about probability of the government destabilization that may happen as a result of 
unconstitutional or violent actions. Political destabilization should not necessary account 
for weak rule of law, especially in the case of Turkey (maybe with the case of an African 
country it could be true correlation). Rule of law in the host country is important to foreign 
investors as they want to be confident in their rights for their products, knowledge and 
other important details of business. However, from this finding we may assume that at 
some point stronger institutional rule of law may be less interesting to foreign investors – 
some of them find weak institutional framework as an easy opportunity to enter to the 
market. Of course it varies from country to country – maybe in some other Asian or 
African country weaker institutional framework is not acceptable for an investor as they 
are protected neither from political instability nor from legal institutions.  
A similar point was made by David Fagan (2008) in his report to US Chinese services 
group. According him, the regulatory and institutional framework may either attract or 
restrict foreign direct investment in the United States. He notes that the effect of 
institutional framework depends on the characteristics of the investment and certain 
circumstances. Namely, it depends on the form and nature of the transaction – whether it 
is an acquisition of assets, and acquisition of merger, an acquisition of majority or 
minority of shares, greenfield or brownfield investment. He points out on specific factors 
that have impact on market entry of foreign investors: the sector or industry of the 
investment, the size of the investment and the location itself. Fagan also indicates the 
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importance of the specific facts of a particular transaction and the characteristics of the 




7.1 Concluding remarks 
Since 2002, Turkish Economy had started recovering from 2000/2001 crises through 
economic and regulatory reforms that improved Turkish economy’s resilience to shocks.   
A set of structural reforms undertaken in the banking sector and a lot of various policies 
conducted in the area of enterprise restructuring, privatization, trade liberalization, labor 
market and business environment boosted Turkey’s foreign and domestic investments, 
increased labor productivity thus inducing economic growth. Along with economic 
stability, political stability had emerged in Turkey since 2001-2002. A new government 
had invested heavily in improvement country’s education level, transport system, and 
manufacturing. Also a lot of attention was paid to legal system and business code.  
These facts played an important role in attracting foreign direct investment in the country. 
In my paper I wanted to check some of these factors empirically. Namely, I wanted to test 
the effect of political stability, education  level, institutional framework (rule of law) and 
trade cost on FDI inflow to Turkey. Inspired by similar analyses of Esiyok (2010), I set 
several hypotheses and employed knowledge capital model to test them after collecting 
relevant data. As a part of knowledge capital model, I also included similarity index into 
my model.  
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My estimations show that increasing political stability and educational level have positive 
effect on the FDI inflow to Turkey while improving institutional framework and trade cost 
- negative effect. Although signs of the last two variables were surprising but they had 
certain explanation behind them. It was inferred that weaker institutional framework can 
be perceived by investors as an opportunity easily to enter to the country. But this may not 
be the case in another country. Whether institutional framework has positive or negative 
effect on FDI inflow depends on the environment of the host country and the 
characteristics of investing firm itself.  
The same with the trade cost – although there are findings where increasing trade cost 
motivates firms to invest in the host country, it had negative effect in my findings. Again, 
this implies that whether higher trade cost will motivate firms to switch to FDI or not 
depends on the nature of investing firm’s business, its strategy and other characteristics.  
For example, if it wants to establish a branch in Turkey to produce some product that will 
be its input for other production in its home country, then most probably it will not be 
willing to invest in Turkey as trade cost between its home country and Turkey becomes 
higher.  
At last, similarity index was found insignificant, implying that similarity in national 
incomes between home countries and the host country (Turkey) has no real impact on 
foreign direct inflow to Turkey.  The result is not surprising since it just confirms the same 
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7.2 Limitations of study and further research 
My model was designed to test the determinants of FDI in Turkey I believe the selected 
variables were good as they were derived based on empirical findings of other authors. 
However, to provide more decent estimations, alternative data sources could be used for 
the selected variables to confirm final estimations. Also, the model could be extended to 
some more variables. Nevertheless, these are just basic limitations that can be present in 
any empirical work.  
The results of estimations were surprising and led me to rethink about employed technique 
and model. For example, the trade cost had negative sign which was not expected initially. 
It was inferred that because foreign firms investing in Turkey are not identical and have 
different production, business strategy, firm vision (and etc.), they may perceive 
increasing trade cost differently. Esiyok (2010) found that increasing trade cost motivates 
firms to switch to FDI while in my findings the opposite trend was found – firms loose 
interest in switching to FDI in Turkey. Of course, possible explanation for the differences 
in data could be caused by larger data and different time period, but the real reason 
probably is another factor. Such studies must be extended to a different point where FDI 
determinants will be tested on firms’ level. It could make clear when trade cost have 
positive or negative effect on FDI inflow.  
Also negative effect of institutional framework (rule of law) on FDI inflow was 
unexpected. Possible explanation is that for some firms higher institutional framework 
could be disadvantage as it can create a lot of bureaucratic barriers to enter to the market. 
Including additional or alternative variables accounting for institutional framework less 
likely could solve the issue. As in case of trade cost, this issue could be solved if 
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estimations were made on firms’ level rather than in country level. Investing firms could 
be divided into groups based on their nature of business, sector, and other characteristics. 
This could give more precise understanding of FDI behavior.  
Similar points were made by other authors too, for example by David Fagan (2008) and 
Tidiane Kinda (2008). Fagan points out on importance of specific factors determining 
foreign direct investment in the host country: the sector or industry of the investment, the 
size of the investment and the location itself. Fagan also indicates the importance of the 
specific facts of a particular transaction and the characteristics of the transaction parties in 
FDI inflow. Kinda (2008) tried to analyze foreign direct investment determinants at firms’ 
level. Using firm level data for 77 developing countries, she provided empirical evidences 
of significant correlation between investment climate and foreign direct investments in 
developing countries. Specifically, she found out that the quality of physical and financial 
infrastructure defines the level of investments from a foreign firm. Her work was distinct 
from previous papers because she found difference between exporter and non-exporter 
firms in their investment behavior. The results of her analyses show physical infrastructure 
is an important factor for firms supplying foreign markets while financing constraints are 
main determinants in decision making of foreign firms supplying local markets.  
These findings show importance of analyses at firms’ level. Therefore, next study 
regarding FDI inflow in Turkey (also other countries was well) must be conducted on that 
level. Although it will be more time consuming and a lot of data demanding work, 
estimations will be more understandable and easy to analyze.  Also, such studies can make 
breakthrough in learning and understanding not only foreign direct investment flows but 
also international trade as well.  
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Annex 
Pooled OLS model 
Oneway (individual) effect Pooling Model 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law,  
    data = fdi.set, model = "pooling", index = c("Country", "Year")) 
 
Balanced Panel: n=29, T=12, N=348 
 
Residuals : 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median 3rd Qu.    Max.  
-5.0500 -1.5500  0.0692  1.5800  5.9100  
 
Coefficients : 
            Estimate Std. Error t-value     Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  -2.8882     1.0381   -2.78       0.0057 **  
LnSimIndex    0.0135     0.1946    0.07       0.9445     
TC           -0.0785     0.0260   -3.02       0.0027 **  
PolStab       2.8602     1.0756    2.66       0.0082 **  
Educ          3.9773     0.5960    6.67 0.0000000001 *** 
Law          -5.1347     2.2621   -2.27       0.0238 *   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    2100 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1760 
R-Squared      :  0.161  
      Adj. R-Squared :  0.158  
F-statistic: 13.1017 on 5 and 342 DF, p-value: 0.0000000000111 
 
Random Effects model 
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model  
   (Swamy-Arora's transformation) 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law,  
    data = fdi.set, model = "random", index = c("Country", "Year")) 
 
Balanced Panel: n=29, T=12, N=348 
 
Effects: 
               var std.dev share 
idiosyncratic 3.13    1.77  0.59 
individual    2.19    1.48  0.41 
theta:  0.674   
 
Residuals : 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 -5.510  -1.070   0.105   1.130   5.460  
 
Coefficients : 
            Estimate Std. Error t-value            Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  -2.5456     1.0324   -2.47              0.0142 *   
LnSimIndex    0.1450     0.4307    0.34              0.7366     
TC           -0.1145     0.0351   -3.26              0.0012 **  
PolStab       2.8696     0.8389    3.42              0.0007 *** 
Educ          3.9395     0.4668    8.44 0.00000000000000091 *** 
Law          -4.9300     1.7713   -2.78              0.0057 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    1390 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1070 
R-Squared      :  0.232  
      Adj. R-Squared :  0.228  
F-statistic: 20.682 on 5 and 342 DF, p-value: <0.0000000000000002 
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Fixed Effects model 
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model 
 
Call: 
plm(formula = LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law,  
    data = fdi.set, model = "within", index = c("Country", "Year")) 
 
Balanced Panel: n=29, T=12, N=348 
 
Residuals : 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median 3rd Qu.    Max.  
-5.6800 -0.9650  0.0428  1.0300  5.3500  
 
Coefficients : 
           Estimate Std. Error t-value          Pr(>|t|)     
LnSimIndex   0.9154     1.0781    0.85           0.39646     
TC          -0.1334     0.0403   -3.31           0.00105 **  
PolStab      2.8573     0.8401    3.40           0.00076 *** 
Educ         3.8549     0.4767    8.09 0.000000000000013 *** 
Law         -4.7912     1.7774   -2.70           0.00740 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    1310 
Residual Sum of Squares: 984 
R-Squared      :  0.248  
      Adj. R-Squared :  0.224  
F-statistic: 20.7653 on 5 and 314 DF, p-value: <0.0000000000000002 
 
Testing for panel effects 
> # Testing for fixed effects, null: OLS better than fixed 
> pFtest(fem, pooled) 
 
 F test for individual effects 
 
data:  LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law 
F = 8.8, df1 = 28, df2 = 314, p-value < 0.00000000000000022 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
 
 
 Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Breusch-Pagan) 
 
data:  LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law 
chisq = 284, df = 1, p-value < 0.00000000000000022 





data:  LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law 
chisq = 1.3, df = 5, p-value = 0.9325 
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent 
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Test for White standard errors clustered by group  
t test of coefficients: 
 
           Estimate Std. Error t value         Pr(>|t|)     
LnSimIndex   0.9154     1.3491    0.68          0.49795     
TC          -0.1334     0.0214   -6.23 0.00000000149364 *** 
PolStab      2.8573     0.8757    3.26          0.00122 **  
Educ         3.8549     0.5159    7.47 0.00000000000079 *** 
Law         -4.7912     1.4134   -3.39          0.00079 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Cross-sectional dependence/contemporaneous correlation 
Testing for cross sectional depndence: using Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence 
and Pasaran CD test 
Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional dependence in panels 
 
data:  formula 
chisq = 645, df = 406, p-value = 0.0000000000004168 
alternative hypothesis: cross-sectional dependence 
 
 
 Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence in panels 
 
data:  formula 
z = 16, p-value < 0.00000000000000022 
alternative hypothesis: cross-sectional dependence 
 
Testing for serial correlation and heteroskadesticity 
 Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel 
models 
 
data:  LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law 
chisq = 95, df = 12, p-value = 0.000000000000004917 
alternative hypothesis: serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors 
 
 
 Breusch-Pagan test 
 
data:  LnFDI ~ LnSimIndex + TC + PolStab + Educ + Law 
BP = 9.8, df = 5, p-value = 0.07974 
 
Controlling for Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
t test of coefficients: 
 
           Estimate Std. Error t value         Pr(>|t|)     
LnSimIndex   0.9154     1.3491    0.68          0.49795     
TC          -0.1334     0.0214   -6.23 0.00000000149364 *** 
PolStab      2.8573     0.8757    3.26          0.00122 **  
Educ         3.8549     0.5159    7.47 0.00000000000079 *** 
Law         -4.7912     1.4134   -3.39          0.00079 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
